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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we present a set ofaxioms guaranteeing that, in exchange 
economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and 
active Walrasian Equilibria aH coincide in the framework of market games. 
Keywords: Mechanism, Market Games, Nash Equilibrium, Strong Equilibrium, 
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1. INTRODUCTlON 
In this paper we present an unifying framework for the study of market 
games in exchange economies. In the framework of c1assical exchange economies 
when all goods are divisible particular market games have been considered by 
Shubik (1977), Schmeidler (1980) and Dubey (1982) (see also the related 
contributions of Shapley and Shubik (1977), Hahn (1978) and Dubey, Mas-Colell 
and Shubik (1980). The case of public goods is considered by Bagnoli and 
Lipman (1989) and Corchon and Wilkie (1990)). A general axiomatic framework 
for double auctions was introduced by Benassy (1986). In that paper he 
proposed a set ofaxioms that define a market game and was able to show that 
1) the Walrasian al!ocation can be supported as a Nash Equilibrium (N.E. in 
the sequell and 2) that when al! markets are active, al! N.E. yield Walrasian 
al!ocations. It was shown by Dubey (1982) in a specific model that N.E. with 
all markets being active and Strong Equilibrium coincide. Later on, Svensson 
(1990 studied the case of indivisible commodities, such as houses or jobs by 
means of a very specific mode!. He proposed a simple market game for which the 
set of Strong Equilibrium out comes coincides with the set of Nash equilibrium 
ou.tcomes when aH the markets are open and with the set of Walrasian 
allocations (other models of indivisibilities inc1ude those of Demange and 
Gale (1985), Roth (1982), Kaneko (1983), Gale (1984), Quinzii (1984), Svensson 
(1984), Kaneko and Yamamoto (1986), Maskin (1987), Svensson (1988), Roth and 
Sotomayor (1988) and Tadenuma and Thomson (1990)). 
A natural question is if the results explained aboye depend on either the 
special structure of the cornmodity space (as in Benassy) or to the particular 
game f orm used in Dubey or Svensson (1 ~ In this paper we address this question 
and show that neither is the case. We present a model where the commodity 
space has no special structure (and thus it could have both divisible and 
indivisible goods) and we propose a set ofaxioms that a market game should 
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Implementation by means of market games has intuitive appeal since the 
underlying mechanism is both natural and simple and implementation occurs in 
Nash and Strong equilibrium. There are, however, sorne costs associated with 
this approach. First, if a strong boundary condition is not assumed, there may 
exist no-trade, usually inefficient, N.E.. This kind of equilibria arise not 
only in the class of models analyzed in this paper (see Dubey (1982), Benassy 
(1986) and Svensson (1991)) but also in Cournot-type models of quantity 
competition (see Hart (1980) and Makowski (1980)). An interesting research 
would be to explore how a trembling hand argument might dispose of no-trade 
equilibria (see Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) for the public good case). In any 
case we can construct examples where a N.E. with sorne in active markets is not 
dominated in the Pareto sense by the Walrasian Equilibria. This rules out 
focal point considerations. Second, the out come function is discontinuous (see 
Benassy (1986) pp. 99-100 for a very convincing argument showing that 
discontinuity 
Certainly his 
is an essential feature of efficient N.E. in market games. 
game, as well as those of Dubey and Schmeidler, have 
discontinuous outcome functions (see Postlewaite and Wettstein (1989) for a 
continuous mechanism implementing the Walrasian correspondence). In our case 
two of our axioms (VT and SBC) imply discontinuities. Therefore small mistakes 
in the strategy space may translate into large discrepancies between intended 
and obtained allocations. However, we do not know if discontinuity is an issue 
here since our commodity space is not necessarily Euclidian and therefore for 
sorne weird topology anything is continuous. 
Because of the aboye reasons, several authors have looked for continuous 
implementation of the the Walrasian correspondence in N.E. in games where 
strategies are prices and quantities and where the strong boundary condition 
is not postulated. The rules of the game -Le. the outcome function- are, 
though, very different since it does not reflect market rules beyond the 
existence of a budget constraint. We will provide sorne axioms under which the 
Walrasian correspondence is implemented in N.E.. Sorne axioms are common to 
this approach and to market games. The reader is reminded that an alternative 
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foundation to the idea of Walrasian equilibrium -not considered in this paper-
is given by the consideration of arbitrarily large economies (i.e. core or 
Cournot limit theorems). 
Our work can be regarded as an application of implementation theory to a 
very specific problem. The authors hope that it might modestly contribute to 
show that implementation is not only about abstruse mechanisms but it can shed 
sorne light on the functioning of real life institutions like double auction 
markets. It should be remarked though that market games mimic but are not 
markets (ljke an artificial heart mimic but is not a heart). In particular 
sorne tendencies that are spontaneous in a market are reflected here in the 
form of the outcome function. 
The main insight of this paper is that from the point of view of 
implementation, convexity -or the lack of it- do es not matter very mucho Other 
insights gained by the study of market games are the following. 1) 
Individually feasibility cannot be guaranteed outside equilibrium(2~ 2) To 
sustain Walrasian allocations as equilibria (Nash or Strong) requires 
relatively harmless and simple assumptions. 3) However, to eliminate 
non-Walrasian equilibria requires very strong assumptions both on the 
mechanism (Le. sorne kind of Bertrand competition) and on preferences (Le. 
our strong boundary condition). And 4) the fact that coalitions can or can not 
be formed do es not matter very much as long as markets are active. Possible 
extensions of our results inelude the consideration of production economies 
and the implementation of other social choice rules by market mechanisms. 
The rest of the paper goes as follows. In the next Section we present our 
model of market games. Section 3 gathers our main results. 
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2. THE MODEL 
This section has five parts. al The description of the environment. bl 
the definition of a social choice correspondence. el the description of a game 
form (also caBed mechanismsl. dl the definition of the game-theoretical 
equilibrium concepts and el the notion of implementation. 
a) Environment 
There are h consumers and n + 1 goods. where n and h are natural numbers. 
Goods l. n are (possiblyl indivisible goods. Good O is a perfectly 
divisible good which can be loosely terrned as money. A net trade for consumer 
is an n + dimensional vector (x 
11' 
... , X .. mil. sometimes also 
In 
represented by (x .• mil. where x (resp. m) is her net trade of commodity g 
1 ig ¡ 
(resp. moneyl. The set of individually feasible net trades for consumer i is 
denoted by XI == C¡ x M¡ where x e e and m e M = [a , ca). We do not impose 
I ¡ I ¡ I 
any structure on C except that e is a subset or Rn • 
i ¡ 
The preferences of over net trades in X I are represented by a utility 
function u¡: X¡~ IR denoted by u
i 
= u¡(x¡' m¡l which is assumed to be 
strictly increasing in money. We will also assume that any bundle inside X is ¡ 
preferred to any bundle outside X (3) and that u () is never decreasing in any ¡ ¡ 
of its arguments. Le. goods can be freely disposable by consumers. Let us 
denote by (x. m) e R (n+ 1) • h the h-tuple of net trades for consumers 1, ...• h 
also referred to as an allocation. An allocation (x. m) is said to be balanced 
if 'lJg = l. . ..• n, ..-h x s O and ..-h m < O. We remark that a balanced 
Li=1 ¡, LI=I I 
allocation does not need to be totally feasible because agents rnay receive net 
trades which are not individually feasible. The set of balanced allocations is 
denoted by F. We will as sume that the number of agents and the individually 
feasible net trade sets are fixed. Thus an economy, denoted either by e or by 
(3) A s¡milar assumptlon ¡s made by Hurw¡cz 0979 b), Schmeidler (1980) and 
Benassy (1986). 
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(u ) , is a list of utility functions, one for each agent. Let us denote 
i 1=1, .• h 
by S the set of admissible economies. 
b) Social Choice Correspondence 
A sociaL choice correspondence ~ : S ~ F maps the set of economies 
into the set of balanced allocations. It is meant to represent the objectives 
of the society. In this paper ~ will be the Walrasian correspondence. In order 
to define this let us first define a Walrasian Equilibrium (W.E in the sequell 
for a particular economy e e S. 
DEFINITION 1. A WaLrasian EquiLibrium for an economy (u ) is a 
1 1 = 1, .. h 
balanced allocatíon (xw , mW ) and a vector of príces pW e IRn such that 't/i 
+ 
h ( W mW ) • ( ) b· t W = O = 1, ... , , xi' 1 maximtzes u l Xl' mi su Ject o p o Xl + mi 
Notice that in the above definition rnoney is the nurneraire. The Walrasian 
social choice correspondence rnaps the set of econornies in allocations that are 
Walrasian equilibria for these econornies. 
e) Garne Forms and Market Garnes 
A Game Form (or a mechanism) is a list (S , n, i = 1, ... , h, where S 
1 1 
denotes the strategy set of consurner i and f is the outcorne function. 
In a rnarket garne a strategy for consurner (playerl i is a 2n dimensional 
vector of real numbers s = (n, q) where n = (n, ... , n ) (resp. q = 
1 1 1 1 II In 1 
(q 11' •••• q 1 n)) represents the vector of bids (resp. net tradesl proposed by 
player L Let us denote by n (resp. by ql the list of bids (resp. net tradesl 
proposed by all players and by s;: (n, q) e IR Z • n . h the list of all strategies 
h for all players. Let S ;: nl =1 SI. 
The outcorne function f rnaps S into the set of balanced allocations, Le. 
f : S ~ F. Let f
l 
be the 
of goods and rnoney obtained 
i th cornponent of f. It represents the allocation 
by i Le. f (s) ;: (x (s), m (s)). Let p be the 
1 1 1 
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n-dimensional vector of trading prices as a function of s, Le. p : S ~ R: 
or p = p(S/4~ The outcome function f is designed to select allocations that 
satisfy the budget constraint of each consumer and thus the quantity of money 
allocated to consumer i, denoted by m (s), is m (s) = - pes) o x (s), where 
I I I 
x (s) is the net trade of goods allocated to i if the strategy s is played. 
I 
d) Equilibrium 
Let v (s) = u (f (s» be the indirect utility function associated with 
I i I 
the list of strategies s e S. AIso let us denote by s. the list of strategies 
-, 
played by all consumers except í. Then we have the following definition: 
Definition 2. A Nash Equilibrium (N.E.) of a game form (S, f) for an 
economy (u.) is a list of strategies sn e S such that 'Vi = 1, 
, 1=1, •. h 
... , h we have that vl(sn) ~ v (s , sn) 'Vs e S. 
I I -1 I I 
A coalition, denoted generically by e, is a non empty subset of the set 
of al! players. A list of strategies for all members of e is denoted by s and 
c 
the corresponding strategy set by S. Similarly s denotes the list of 
c -c 
strategies for al! players not in e. 
Definition 3. A Strong Equilibrium (S.E.) of a game form (S, f) for an 
economy (u ) is a list of strategies SS e S such that there is no 
I 1=1, .• h 
coalition e, such that v (s, s·) ~ vl(ss), some s e S, 'Vi e e and 
1 e -e e e 
s s . (5) 
v (s , S ) > V (s ) f or some J e e . j c -c j 
(4) Benassy does not as sume dlrectly, as we do, that aH traders buy at the 
same price (however at any N.E. their tradlng prlces are identlcall. Thls 
posslbillty can be consldered In our model at the cost of sorne complicatlons. 
(5) An alternatlve deflnltlon of strong equHlbrlum requlres that the 
inequality be strlct for aH members of C. In our model both notlons coincide. 
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e) Implementation 
Let NE(S, f. el be the set of Nash Equilibrium strategies for the 
mechanism (S, fl and the economy e. Let SE(S, f, el be the set of Strong 
Equilibrium strategies for the mechanism (S, fl and the economy e. Then, we 
come to the main definitions of the papero 
Definition 4. The Game form (S, f) implements a social choice 
correspondence 4> in the domain g in Nash Equilibrium if Ve e g we have 
that NE(S, f, e) ~ 0 and 4>(e) = f(NE(S, f, e». 
Definition 5. The Game form (S, f) implements a social choice 
correspondence 4> in the domain g in Strong Equilibrium if Ve e g we have 
that SE(S, f, e) ~ 0 and 4>(e) = f(SE(S, f, e». 
Definitions 4 and 5 refer to the equilibrium concepts that we will use in 
the remainder of the papero The notion of N.E. is relevant in a non 
cooperative framework, where agents can not engage in binding agreements. The 
notion of a S.E. is meant to capture the outcome of a game where cooperation 
is feasible, Le. any binding agreement is possible. If the designer does not 
have a priori information about the feasibility of those agreements, it 
appears to be desirable that implementation occurs for both scenarios. This is 
the concept of double implementation, a term coined by Eric Maskin, and that 
we present formally in the next definition. 
Definition 6. The Game form (S, f) doubly implements in Nash and Strong 
equilibrium a social choice correspondence 4> in the domain g if Ve e g we 
have that SE(S, f, e) *' 0 and 4>(e) = f(SE(S, f, e» = f(NE(S, f, e». 
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3. RESULTS 
In this Section we gather our main findings on market games. Let us first 
present our two first axioms: 
Unanimity (U).- If s ;: (rr. q) E S is such that far all active traders 
(Le. thase far which x (s) "" O) rr rr. then pes) = rr. If there are na 
1 i J 1 
active traders but rr = rr. lJi. J = 1 •...• h. then pes) rr
1
• Moreaver. 
1 J 
if q is a balanced allocatian then x(s) = q. 
Voluntary Trade (VT).- IJg = 1. . ..• n. lJi = 1. . ..• h. IJ s E S, such 
that x (s) > O (resp. < O) then p (s) :s (resp. ~) rr . 
i g g ig 
Unanimity (U) roughly says that if al! bids are the same, and the 
proposed net trade vector is balanced, trading prices must be equal to these 
bids and net trades allocated by the mechanism must be equal to the net trades 
asked by consumers. This is a very weak property which must be satisfied by 
any satisfactory model of resource allocation in market economies. 
The Voluntary Trade (VT) property says that in order to get a positive 
(resp. negative) net trade of sorne commodity, say J. the trading price of J 
must be greater or equal (resp. lower or equaU than the minimum (resp. 
maximum) price at which any seller (resp. buyer) is willing to supply (resp. 
demand) this good. Under the VT property the interpretation of bids is that if 
consumer i is a 
(resp. minimum) 
units of good j. 
net demander (resp. supplier) of good J, rr is the maximum 
lJ 
price at which she is prepared to accept a net trade of q 
lj 
Special cases of this property have been proposed by Benassy 
((1986) p. 100), Svensson (1991) and Silvestre (1985). 
Now, we are prepared to prove our first resulto 
Proposition 1. Let (S. f) be a game farm in which VT and U hold. Then. if 
(pw. x w• m W ) is a W.E .• 3 s such that s is a S.E. and fes) = (xw• m W ). 
12 
Proof: Let us first construct s. For a typicaL consumer i, Let 7r = pW and q ¡ ¡ 
= x
W
. Then, by U, fes) = (xw, m W ) and pW = pes). Therefore if the Proposition 
I 
were not true there is a coaLition C, and a s' E S such that v (s', 
e e ¡ e 
S ) ~ v (s), Vi E C and v (s', S ) > VeS) for some j E C. Let (X:, m') = 
-e i J e -e J 1 ¡ 
f.cs', S ), Vi E C. Let aLso p' be the new vector of trading prices, Le. p' 
I e -e 
= pes', S ). Then by reveaLed preference we have pW o X' + m' ~ pW o X W + mW 
e -e ¡ ¡ 
Vi E C and 3 j E C for whom the inequaLity is strict. 
Since p' o X; + m; = O, it foHows from that and the previous inequaLity 
that X; o (p' - pW) oS O V i E C and 3 j E C for whom the inequaLity is 
strict. Adding over i we get: 
(p' - pW) o ~ X' < O L.iEC ¡ (1) 
Since the WaLrasian equiLibrium is Pareto Efficient, C can not be 
composed of aH agents. Also, if the sum of net demands of C of a good is 
negative (Le. C is a net suppLier of, say commodity g) we have two cases. If 
the complementary coaLition is a net demander of g, by VT it must be that p' :s 
g 
7r = pW some r E C, since aH sellers outside the coaLition are bidding pW. 
rg g 
If the complementary coalition is not a net demander of g by adding the budget 
constraints we get that p' = O since g( ) selects allocations in F. In any 
g 
case, the corresponding term in (1) aboye is positive or zero. A similar (but 
simpler) argument can be used if some component of x; is positive. This shows 
that the inequality (1) aboye is impossible .• 
The logic behind Proposition 1 is the following: Suppose that market 
prices and the allocation are Walrasian but now a group of agents, say all the 
oil producing countries, collude and attempt to raise the price of oil. Since 
importing countries make no change in their bidding strategies, VT implies 
that oH producing countries cannot sell a single drop of oH and thus can not 
improve their welfare by colluding. Since a S.E. is a N.E., we have that: 
Corollary 1. Let (S, f) a game form in which VT and U hold. Then, if 
(pw,xw,mw) is a W.E., 3s such that s is a N.E. and fes) = (xw, mW ). 
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In order to obtain a converse to Proposition 1 we will impose additional 
properties on the outcome function. First we will assume that the utility 
function is continuous on money. We will also assume the following property: 
Reactiveness (R).- Let s a strategy profile sueh that in market g, T( > 
Ig 
T( with x (s) > O and x (s) < O. Then 3 s', identieaL to s exeept in jg Ig Jg 
eomponent r (with r = i or r =j) su eh that: 
x (s') 
r 
x (s), (p (s') - p (s» x (s) < O and p (s) = p (s') Vk '" g. 
r g g rg k k 
This axiom means that, when the bid made by a buyer is greater than the 
bid made by a seller, there is a way for (at least) one of them to change the 
price without affecting either her consumption bundle or the other prices. 
Recall that we are interpreting 1['5 as maximum buying (resp. minimum selling) 
bids. Thus, Axiom R says that any discrepancy between those bids can be 
eliminated by our market game with a minimal impact on allocations and other 
prices. In other words, the mechanism mimics what in this circumstances is a 
natural reaction of maximizing agents, namely to press the market price 
downwards (buyers) or upwards (sellers). We remark that this axiom does not 
imply that general equilibrium effects are somehow neglected. What it means is 
that when two agents want to change a particular price, the market games gives 
room to, at least, one of them to do so and to leave other prices unaffected. 
This axiom is automatically satisfied in general equilibrium models of price-
making agents and in Svensson (1991). We will now postulate the following: 
Possibility of Trade (PT). Vi E 1, Vs , 3s sueh that x (s, s ) has no 
-1 1 1 1 -1 
zero component. 
This axiom can be understood as saying that all markets can be activated 
by an unilateral move of an agent. For instance, by offering a sufficiently 
low (resp. high) bid trader i can sell (resp. buy) sorne quantity of any good. 
Recall that bids are not required to be positive. Before we state a new axiom 
let us introduce a new piece of notation. B (p) will denote the budget set of 
1 
individual i at prices p, Le., B (p)= { (x, m ) E X / P o x + m s O}. 
1 1 1 i 1 1 
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Strong Bertrand Competition (SBC).- Let s be a strategy profile where aL! 
active traders quote the same price p. Then if the number of active 
traders is greater than 2, we have the foLLowing: 
B(n) e B,(p(s» and XE B(n) ---7 3 q such that x¡= f¡(n¡, q¡, s_¡). ¡ ¡ 1 ¡ ¡ ¡ ¡ 
The SBC Axiom says that a seller (resp. a buyer l by cutting (resp. 
increasingl the market price can transact as much as it wants. This is al so 
satisfied in Svensson (1991). Notice that in the case of two active traders 
this axiom is problematic as shown by the following example: 
Example. Let n = 2, and suppose there are two units of a unique indivisible 
good owned by agent 2. Let: s = (150, J), s = (150, -J), s = (160, 2), s = 
_ _ 1 2 1 2 
(150, -1) and s = (160, 2), s = (160, -2). By Unanimity x(s, s) = (1, -1) 
1 2 1 2 
and X(s, s) = (2, -2). Applying the previous Axiom to (s, s ) and (s, s) 
12 1:t_ 12 
we get that x(s, s) = (2, -2). But applying this Axiom to (s, s ) and (s, 
1 2 1 2 1 
S ) we get that x(s , s ) = (1, -J). 
2 1 2 
The reason why SBC does not work with 2 agents is that it is not possible 
to identify the deviant agent. This sort of problem is familiar to the theory 
of Nash implementation since Maskin (1977). Before we prove our next resulto 
let us now introduce the following assumption: 
Strong Boundary Assumption (SBA).- e = IR I . 'Vi = 1, ... , h, any point 
I + 
interior of X¡ is preferred to any point in the boundary of XI' 
Proposition 2. Under axioms U, VT, R, PT and SBC and assumption SBA if h > 2, 
any N.E. yields a Walrasian aLLocation. 
Proof: First notice that SBA and PT imply that aL! markets are open. We will 
now prove that for any pair of active traders i and j, in a market, say g, we 
ha ve that in any N.E. n = n . 
19 jg 
Because VT if the market is active and, say x (s) > O (resp. <y, it must 
19 
be that pes) :s (resp. ~) n . Suppose that 3 a pair of active traders i and j 
19 
such that n > n. where i (resp. j) is the net buyer (resp. seller). Suppose 
19 Jg 
that in Axiom R, r = L Then, 3 s' such that 
1 
15 
x (s') x (S), p (s') < p (s» and p (s) = p (s'), 'Vk ~ g. 
I I g g k k 
But then, i is clearly better off by playing s: beca use preferences are 
1 
monotonic on money. This contradicts that we are at a N.E .. The same argument 
holds if r = j. Therefore, in any N.E., al! active traders quote the same 
price, say 1[1. By U, if s is a N.E. strategy profíle, pes) = 1[1. 
Let us now assume that a trader, say i, is not obtaining her most 
preferred bundle in B (p(s». Thus 3x' such that u (x', -p(s)ox') > u (g (s), 
I I I I I i I 
-p(s)og (s». Pick a o such that u (x', -p(s)ox'-o) 2: u (g (s), -p(s)og (s». 
i i I I I I I 
Suppose that x (s) > O. Let 1[' be such that 1[' = 1[' for k ~ i and 1[' = 
Ig I ik Ik Ig 
P + 0/2x'. Note that 1['0 y = p(s)oy + 0/2x' . Thus if (y, m) e B (1['), then 
g Ig I Ig I I 
(y, m) e B (p(s». By Axiom SBC, 3 s: such that x' = gJs', s ). However by 
I 1 I 1 I -1 
VT we ha ve that p(s')ox' ~ L p (s)ox: + p (s)ox' + 0/2. Then, we ha ve that 
I k*g k 1 g Ig 
U (x', -p(s)ox'-0/2) > u (g (s), -p(s)og (s» contradicting that s was a N.E .• 
I I I I I I 
Thus, we have the following: 
Corollary 2. Under the conditions of Proposition 2, any S.E. yields 
Walrasian al!ocations. 
Theorem 1. Any market game satisfying U, VT, R, PT, SBC and SBA with h > 2 
doubly implements the Walrasian correspondence in Nash and Strong equ¡Zibrium. 
Notice that the failure of market games to implement the Walrasian 
correspondence is not related to the lack of Maskin monotonicity (see Maskin 
(1977)). In fact, it is not difficult to show that in our framework, the 
Walrasian correspondence is Maskin monotonic and implementable in N.E. (see 
e.g. Theorem 2 below). This is because we do not require the outcome function 
to select individually feasible net trades. In our case, what it might "trap" 
the economy in the wrong position is the combination of a violation of SBC and 
the VT axiom .A good example of it is provided by Svensson, p. 873. We now 
switch to the study of non market mechanisms. The first axiom is: 
Avoidable Rationing (AR).- 'Vi = 1, ... , h, '<Is_1 
* i, '<1 x' e e, 3q' such that x' = x (1[ , q', s ). 
I I I I I k I -1 
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such that 1[ 
k 
1[ 
J 
'<Ik,j 
This property means that if al! agents submit identical bidding vectors. 
any consumer can achieve any bundle just asking for it. The difference of this 
axiom with SBC is that in order to obtain the desired bundle agents are not 
asked to beat the market price (as in SBC). merely to repeat it. Notice that 
this property is incompatible with totally feasible implementation (i.e. an 
outcome function which selects feasible allocations inside X for each agent. 
1 
see Hurwicz. Maskin and Postlewaite (1982)). since for sorne strategies the 
resultant bundles may be individually unfeasible. A related property (i.e. 
that consumption bundles obtained by any agent are an increasing function of 
her proposals) has been termed manipulable rationing by Benassy (1982 p.24). A 
rule which comes very close to AR is Proportional Rationing (see Dubey 
(1982)). Similarly. many other manipulable rationing rules are in the spirit 
of AR. Two examples of AR are the following: 
Let q = L q . Then \li = L ...• h, \lg 1, ... • n, 
g J g 
x q. - q Ih or x q .. hl (h - 1) - q l(h-1) 
ig 19 g ig 19 g 
(see Hurwicz (1979 b) and c) and Schmeidler (1980)). 
In order to state our next axiom let us define the set A (s ,rr). and 
1 -1 1 
the average bid of all agents except i. denoted by TI : 
1 
A(s, rr) 
1 -i i { (xI' m) e X I (x , m) = f (q , rr l' S ) so me q } i I i I I -1 I 
TI = L rr / (h - 1). 
I p" I J 
A (s ,rr) is the set of allocations that i can achieve by the choice of 
i -1 I 
sorne proposed net trade, given her vector of bids and the list of strategies 
of all agents except i. 
Aurea Mediocritas (AM).- A (s , rr ) e A (s , TI ), \1 rr ~ TI • 
I -1 1 I -1 I I I 
This axiom implies that agents whose bids are not equal to the average 
bid of the other agents are penalized. This is a generalization of an idea 
first introduced by Hurwicz (1979 b). It is clear that AM is compatible with a 
continuous outcome functions since the penalty to the deviating agent can be 
made continuous on the strategies. Then. we have the following: 
17 
Theorem 2: Suppose that preferences are strictly monotonic. Then, any market 
game satisfying AR, U and AM implements in N.E. the Walrasian correspondence. 
Proof: Let us first pro ve that the Wiilrasian aHocation can be obtained as a 
N.E .. Give to the agents the Walrasian strategies as in Proposition 1. Thus, 
for a typical consumer, say i, let rr = pW and q = x W • Then, by U, 
I I I 
fes) (xw , m W) and pW pes). Therefore if the Proposition were not true 
there is an agent, say i, and a s' E S such that v (s', s ) > v (s). Let 
I i 1 1 -1 1 
(x', m') = f (s', s ), Vi. Let also p' be the new vector of trading prices. 
1 1 1 i -1 
Because axiom AM if i changes her strategy and gain it must be by repeating 
the Walrasian prices. But then AR implies that she can not do it better. 
Conversely in a N. E. AM implies that aH agents should send the same 
vector of bids. Therefore all bids are identical and by U trading prices equal 
these bids. But then AR implies that any trader can choose her most preferred 
bundle in her budget set and, thus, the allocation is Walrasian. _ 
The question about the axioms under which double implementation of the 
Walrasian correspondence in N.E. and S.E.occurs outside the real m of market 
mechanisms still open. See Schmeidler (980) for an example of such a family 
of mechanisms. 
18 
REFERENCES 
[1] Bagnoli, M. and B. Lipman, "Provision of Public Goods: Fully Implementing 
the Core through Private Contributions", Review of Economic Studies, 
1989, n.56 pp. 583-601. 
[2] Benassy, J.P., The Economics of Market Disequilibrium, Academic P., 1982. 
[3] Benassy, J.P., "On Competitive Market Mechanisms", Econometrica, 1986 
n. 54, pp. 95-108. 
[4] Corchon, L.C., S. Wilkie. "Doubly Implementing the Ratio Correspondence 
by Means of a Natural Mechanism". Mimeo BeLLcore and U. de Alicante 1990. 
[5] Crawford, V.P. and W.P. Heller, "Fair Division with Indivisible 
Commodities", Journal of Economic Theory, 1979 n. 21, pp. 10-27. 
[6] Demange, G. and D. Gale, "The Strategy Structure of Two-sided Matching 
Markets", Econometrica, 1985 n. 53, pp. 873-888. 
19 
17] Dubey, P., "Price-Quantity Strategic Market Garnes", Econometrica, 1982 
n. 50, pp. 111-126. 
l8] Dubey, P.A. Mas-Colell and M. Shubik, "Efficiency Properties of Strategic 
Market Garnes: An Axiornatic Approach", JournaL of Economic Theory, 1980 n. 
2.2., pp. 339-362.. 
[9] Gale, D., "Equilibriurn in a Discrete Exchange Economy with Money", 
InternationaL JournaL of Game Theory, 1984 n. 13,pp. 61-64. 
[10 Hahn, F.H., "On Non-Walrasian Equilibria", Review of Economic Studies, 
1978 n. 45. 
ll1 Hart, O., "Perfect Competition and Optirnal Product Differentiation", 
JournaL of Economic Theory, 1980 n. 22, pp. 279-312. 
[12] Hurwicz, L., "On Allocations Attainable Through Nash Equilibria", 
JournaL of Economic Theory, 1979al n. 21, pp. 140-165. 
[13] Hurwicz, L., "Outcorne Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl 
Allocations at Nash Equilibriurn Points", Review of Economic Studies, 
1979bl n. 46, pp. 217-225. 
20 
[14] Hurwicz, L., "Balanced Outcome functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl 
Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points for Two or More Agents", in J.R. 
Green and J. Scheinkman Eds., General Equilibrium, Growth and Trade: 
essays in Honor of LioneL McKenzie, Academic Press 1979c). 
[15 Hurwicz, L., E. Maskin and A. Postlewaite, "feasible Implementation of 
Social Choice Correspondences by Nash Equilibria", Mimeo, Universities of 
Minnesota and Pennsylvania 1982. 
[16 Kaneko, M., "Housing Market with Indivisibilities ", JoucnaL of Urban 
Economics, 1983 n. 13 pp. 22-50. 
[17] Kaneko, M. and Y. Yamamoto, ''The Existence and Computation of Competitive 
Equilibria in Markets with an Indivisible Commodity", JournaL of Economic 
Theory, 1986 n. 38, pp. 118-136. 
[18] Makowski, L., "Perfect Competition, the Profit Criterion and the 
Organization of Economic Activity", JournaL of Economic Theory, 1980 n. 
22, pp. 222-242. 
[19] Maskin, E., "Nash Implementation and Welfare Optimality". Mimeo, MIT. 
21 
[20] Maskin, E., "On the Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods", in G. Feiwell 
Ed., Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of PubLic Policy, 1987 
MacMillan Press, London pp. 343-349. 
[211 Postlewaite, A., Wettstein, D. "Feasible and Continuous Implementation", 
Review of Economic Studies, 1989, n. 56 pp. 603-611. 
[22] Quinzii, M., "Core and Equilibria with Indivisibilities", InternationaL 
JournaL of Came Theory, 1984 n. 13, pp. 41-61. 
[23] Roth, A.E., "Incentive Compatibility in a Market with Indivisible 
Goods", Economic Letters, 1982 n. 9, pp. 127-132. 
[24] Roth, A.E. and M. Sotomayor, "Interior Points in the Core of Two-sided 
Matching Markets", JournaL of Economic Theory, 1988 n. 45 pp. 85-101. 
[25 Schmeidler, D., "Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions", 
Econometrica, 1980 n. 48 pp. 1585-1593. 
[26] Shapley, LL. and M. Shubik, "Trade Using One Commodity as a Means of 
Payment", JournaL of PoLiticaL Economy, 1977 n. 85 pp. 937-968. 
22 
[27] Shubik, M., "A Price-Quantity Buy-Sell Market With or Without Contingent 
Bids", CowLes Foundation Discussion Paper, 1977. 
[28] Silvestre, J., "Voluntary and Efficient Allocations are Walrasian", 
Econometrica, 1985 n. 53 pp. 807-816. 
[29] Svensson, L.-C., "Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price 
Equilibriurn and Fairness", Econometrica, 1983 n. 51 pp. 939-954. 
[30] Svensson, L.-C., "Competitive Equilibria with Indivisible Coods", 
Zeitschrift fur NationaLokonomie, 1984 n. 44 pp. 375-386. 
[31] Svensson, L.-C., "Fair Wages when Individual Choice Sets Are Incomplete: 
An Application of a Model with Indivisibilities", Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics, 1988 n. 90 pp. 563-573. 
[32] Svensson, L.-C., "Nash Implementation of Competitive Equilibria in a 
Model with Indivisible Coods", Econometrica, 1991. 
[33] Tadenurna, K. and W. Thomson, "No-envy, Consistency and Monotonicity in 
Economies with Indivisibilities", Econometrica, 1990. 
23 
[34] Tian, G. "Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence without 
Continuous, Convex and Ordered Preferences". Social Choice and Welfare, 
1992, n. 9, pp. 117-130. 
[35] Walker, M., "A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl 
Allocations", Econometrica, 1981 n. 49 pp. 65-71. 
